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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
: 
STATE OF UTAH, J 
Plaintiff-Appellant, \ 
VS. \ 
MARK RENFRO, J 
Defendant-Respondent, 
: Case No. 860101 
: Category No, 2 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court was 
correct in dismissing the charge of arranging to distribute a 
controlled substance for value against the defendant. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The defendant, Mark Renfro, was charged with arranging to 
distribute a controlled substance for value, a third-degree 
felony, in violation of Section 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv), Utah Code 
Annotated (Supplement 1983) (House Bill No. 241, Amendment 
effective April 28, 1986) (R. 14). After a bench trial, the 
Court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss (R. 43-45). The 
State of Utah appealed the Fourth Judicial Court of Utah County, 
State of Utah Order of Dismissal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 28, 1985, two undercover officers from Provo City 
Police Department went to the defendant's residence in Orem Utah. 
There they talked to the defendant about purchasing marijuana. 
The defendant went into his bedroom and retrieved a small bag of 
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marijuana from his shaving kit and returned shortly thereafter• 
Officer Guynn handed the defendant $100•00 and received two 
baggies of marijuana each containing one-half ounce of marijuana. 
After the transaction was completed, the officers left the 
defendant's residence. (R. 60-62) 
At the trial, the Court received the evidence presented by 
the State and the defendant did not put on any evidence. 
(R. 66). After hearing argument, the Court took the matter under 
advisement. It subsequently issued a revised Memorandum Decision 
and Order granting Defendant's request for dismissal on the 29th 
day of January, 1986. (A copy of the Court's decision is 
contained in Appendix A in the Respondent's Addendum). The Court 
stated beginning at Paragraph 4 of its Decision: 
The Court is persuaded that the evidence establishes 
conduct which is clearly in violation of the statute 
of the State of Utah governing the distribution for 
value of a controlled substance (Section 58-37-8(1) 
(a)(ii), as defendant contends, and that the defendant 
should have been charged under the offense rather than 
with arranging to distribute a controlled substance for 
value (Section 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv)...Because of the State's 
failure to properly charge the defendant with the 
offense of distribution for value rather than arranging, 
the Court grants the defendant's Motion to Dismiss... 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court's Order should be upheld because the conduct 
complained of by the State clearly was in violation of Section 
58-37-8(1)(a)(ii), Utah Code Annotated, (1953) as amended, or 
distribution for value and not pursuant to Section 58-37-8(1)(a) 
(iv) (Supplement 1983) or arranging. Further, the Supreme Court 
has misinterpreted the meaning of the arranging statute pursuant 
2 
to Section 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (Supplement 1983). 
INTRODUCTION TO ARGUMENT 
The defendant-respondent agrees with the State that this 
brief should be read in conjunction with the State's brief filed 
in two other cases having related issues—State v. Fixel, Case 
No. 860151 and State v. Fixel, Case No. 860173. Further it 
should be pointed out that the phrase "instead of" was inserted 
for the phrase "in lieu of" in Section 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv), Utah 
Code Annotated, (1953), as amended, which became effective 
April 28, 1986, and therefore, the arranging statute's meaning 
has not been changed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED THE CHARGE FILED 
AGAINST DEFENDANT. 
It goes without saying and according to 73 Am. Jur. 2nd. 
Statutes, Section 295: 
Penal statutes are construed with such strictness as to 
safeguard the rights of the defendant. If the statute 
contains a patent ambiguity and admits of two reasonable and 
contradictory constructions, that which operates in favor 
of a party accused under its provisions is to be preferred. 
Moreover, penal statutes are not to be extended in their 
operation to persons, things, or acts not within their 
descriptive terms, or the fair and clear import of the 
language used. Nothing can be read into penal statutes 
by implication. The fact that the statute may be easily 
evaded furnishes no excuse for supplying by judicial 
construction that which is palpably omitted therefrom. 
These rules prevail even though the court thinks that 
the legislature ought to have made the statute more 
comprehensive. The application of the rule of strict 
construction of criminal statutes is especially 
appropriate where intent alone is made the basis of the 
crime. 
The Court's ruling, however, should be upheld for more basic 
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reasons. The defendant joins with the State in its brief filed 
in the cases of Fixel above-mentioned and respectfully request 
the Court to overrule State vs. Hicken, 659 P.2d 1038 (Utah 
1983), State v. Harrison, 601 P.2d 922 (Utah 1979) and State v. 
Onevaris, 674 P.2d 103 (Utah 1983). 
The dispute revolves around the construction of Section 
58-37-8(1)(a)(iv), Utah Code Annotated, (Supplement 1983), as 
amended, and its meaning. 
The Utah Supreme Court has divided the statute into two 
distinct crimes. That is, the Utah Supreme Court had read the 
statute as follows: 
To agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute 
or dispense a controlled substance for value. To 
negotiate to have a controlled substance distributed 
or dispensed for value and distribute, dispense, 
or negotiate the distribution or dispensing of any 
other liquid, substance, or material in lieu of the 
specific controlled substance so offered, agreed, 
consented, arranged, or negotiated. 
That is, the Supreme Court has made two separate crimes out 
of this statute by making the alternation i.e. "or," be the 
prominent point of division. The Respondent's position is that 
such a division is improper and that the proper division must be 
made at the conjunctive, i.e., "and," thereby reading the statute 
as one sentence as is set forth in the code which only proscribes 
one activity. In other words, the Respondent's position is that 
it is only a violation of Section 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv), Utah Code 
Annotated, (1953), as amended, if there is both an arrangement to 
distribute a controlled substance and then in lieu (or instead of 
as the law presently reads) the controlled substance so arranged 
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to be distributed a substitution is made for the controlled 
substance originally arranged to be distributed/ e.g., marijuana 
is arranged to be distributed, but some other substance in lieu 
or instead thereof is actually distributed. 
According to K. Carter, A CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 
(1977), at 46-47: 
Conjunction. Connecting two statements by inserting 
•and1 between them produces a conjunction, and each of 
the connecting statements is a conjunct. Consider these 
two statements: 15:3 Peter Parker is a student at Cornell. 
15:4 Spiderman is now in Ithaca. The following statement 
is their conjunction: 15:5 Peter Parker is a student at 
Cornell and Spiderman is now in Ithaca. If both (15:3) 
and (15:4) are true (15:5) is true: if either conjunct 
is false, (15:5) will be false also....Alternation. 
Connecting two statements by inserting 'or1 between 
them produces an alternation, and each of the connected 
statements is an alternative. If we connect (15:3) and 
(15:4) with forf instead of with 'and1 we have this 
alternation: 15:6 Peter Parker is a student at Cornell 
or Spiderman is now in Ithaca. If either (15:3) or (15:4) 
is true, (15:6) is true; if both alternatives are false 
(15:6) will be false also.11 [Emphasis in the original]. 
If the letter "A" represents the phrase "To agree, consent, 
offer," if the letter "B" represents the phrase "arrange to 
distribute or dispense a controlled substance for value," if the 
letter "C" represents the phrase "to negotiate to have a 
controlled substance distributed for value or dispense for 
value," and the letter "D" represents the phrase "distribute, 
dispense, or negotiate the distribution or dispensing of any 
other liquid, substance, or material in lieu of the specific 
controlled substance so offered, agreed, consented, arranged, or 
negotiated," then such representations reads (A or B or C and D). 
The Supreme Court has grouped the aforesaid letters as [(A or B) 
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or (C and D)3. The Respondent's position is that the logical 
construction and grouping should be read [(A or B or C) and p]. 
Therefore^ the construction of the grouping will determine 
whether or not a crime has been committed. That is, under the 
Supreme Court's theory if either the letters (A or B) are true a 
crime has been committed/ but the defendant's position is that (A 
or B or C) must be true and P must also be true before a crime 
has been committed* 
It can readily been seen by looking at the statute the 
Respondent's postion is correct• The last phrase reads "of any 
other liquid/ substance/ or material in lieu of the specific 
controlled substance so offered/ agreed/ consented/ arranged/ or 
negotiated.w [Emphasis added]• If the Supreme Court's position 
were correct this phrase would read "material in lieu of the 
specific controlled substance so negotiated«w [Emphasis added]• 
It can be seen that as the statute presently readsf the words "so 
offered/ agreed/ consented/ arranged/ or negotiated/11 refer to 
the phrases identified as (A or B or C) as previously identified 
and not merely to the phrase previously identified by the letter 
C. 
The California case of People v. Brownr 357 P.2d 1072 (1960) 
attached hereto as Appendix B dealt with the specific problem in 
issue. Footnote 1 set forth in the Brown case has been 
renumbered as Section 11352 of the Uniform Controlled Substance 
Act of the California Code and is attached hereto as Appendix C. 
Footnote 2 set forth in the Brown case has been renumbered as 
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Section 11355 of the Uniform Controlled Substance Act of the 
California Code and is attached hereto as Appendix D. 
The Brown case dealt with a violation of what is now Section 
11352 of the California Code. It should be noted that Utah does 
not have a statute similar to Section 11352 of the California 
Coder but Section 58-37-8(7) Utah Code Annotated (1953) , as 
amended, deals with conspiracies and attempts* It also does not 
appear that the California Code specifically deals with 
conspiracies and attempts under a separate section as does the 
Utah Code. 
It can be seen that the statute dealt with in the Brown case 
under the footnote 2 is now Section 11355 of the California Code 
and that Section 11355 of the California Code is the same statute 
as Section 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv), Utah Code Annotated (1953) , as 
amended. 
The Court in Brown noted at page 1074 with reference to the 
statute which has now been renumbered Section 11355: 
Section 11503 [now Section 11355] makes it a crime 
to offer to sell a narcotic and then deliver a sub-
stitute. Proposed Section 11509...would have made 
it a crime to offer to sell a narcotic coupled with 
the acceptance of money, even though there was no 
delivery of anything. 
In recommending the passage of Section 11503, 
[now Section 11355] , the subcommittee stated: [this 
section] will be entirely new law. This will cover 
the individual who agrees to sell, furnish, transport, 
or give away any narcotic, and then delivers some 
other liquid, substance or material. These indivi-
duals are known to be in a position to violate the 
law; but, for some reason, they may feel that they 
are dealing with a law enforcement officer and thus 
deliver tobacco, water, or some other substance with 
the result that they have had the intent to commit 
the crime but are testing out the officer. 
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At the present time nothing can be done to that 
person, except to charge [him] with 'bunco.1 . ••. 
The subcommittee thus made clear its view that 
Section 11501 [now Section 11352] did not encompass 
an offer to sell a narcotic and subsequent delivery 
of a substitute. 
The point made in the Brown case is that Section 11352 of 
the California Code deals with an offer to sell while Section 
11355 of the California Code makes it a crime to offer to sell a 
narcotic and the delivery of a substitute. 
Additionally, the Brown case notes that specific intent is 
required as an essential element of offering to make a sale in 
violation of Section 11352 of the California Code. Although the 
issue with regard to the intent required for $ violation of 
Section 11355 of the California Code has not been definitely 
decided by the California Supreme Court, the case of People v. 
Lechlinski, 131 Cal. Rptr. 701, 60 Cal. App. 3d 766 (1976) states 
with reference to whether specific intent or general intent is 
necessary for a violation of Section 11355 of the Health and 
Safety Code, of the California Code that: 
We therefore hold that it is immaterial to a 
violation of Section 11503 (now 11355) whether 
the defendant either before or at the time of 
delivery of the non-narcotic substance, intends 
to deliver a narcotic or some innocuous material, 
this section is violated if there is an offer of 
a narcotic and subsequent delivery of a non-
narcotic substance. 
It, therefore, appears that Section 11352 of the California 
Code requires specific intent in order for there to be a 
violation while Section 11355 of the California Code only 
requires general intent. At any rate, Utah does not have a 
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statute similar to Section 11352 of the California Code and it 
would seem strange to require specific intent for a violation of 
Section 58-37-3(1)(a)(iv) in some circumstances while only 
requiring general intent in others* Additionally, in our case, 
the defendant made a direct sale and did not offer to sell one 
thing and then sell something else in lieu thereof or instead of. 
The California case of People v. Shepard, 337 P.2d 214 
(1959) dealt with the defendant's claim with what is now Section 
11355 of the California Code was unconstitutional as being vague, 
uncertain, and unintelligible. The Court in Shepard noted at 
page 127: 
A reading of the Section answers the assertions of 
the appellant to the effect that it is vague, un-
certain and unintelligible. Men of common intel-
ligence do not have to guess at what it means.... 
There is a reasonably adequate disclosure of the 
legislative intent regarding the evil to be 
combatted in language giving fair notice of 
practices to be avoided....A reading of the Section 
discloses that it is a crime for a person to agree 
to sell a narcotic to someone, and then to deliver 
instead a non-narcotic substance. 
The Utah Supreme Court cannot place two interpretations on 
the arranging statutes if it intends to uphold the arranging 
statute as constitutional. Either the statute is vague, uncertain, 
and unintelligible or it means what it says, i.e., to offer to sell 
a narcotic and deliver a substitute instead. Also note other 
states have statutes similar to Utah and other states also do not 
have a statute similar to Section 11352 of the California Code. 
See Section 453.323 of the Nevada Revised Statutes attached 
hereto and incorporated by reference, as Appendix E. It should 
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be pointed out that the apparent reason is that Utah and Nevada 
has an attempt and conspiracy statute which California does not 
specifically have* 
Reading Section 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv), Utah Code Annotated 
(1953), as amended, in accordance with the Supreme Court's prior 
interpretation makes Sections 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) and 58-37-8(7), 
Dtah Code Annotated (1953), as amended, superfluous and would 
additionally appear to cause equal protection violations under 
the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution together 
with Utah Case Law, 
California has consistently interpreted Section 11355 of 
West's Ann, Health and Safety Code as requiring an offer or 
arrangement to sell a narcotic and subsequent delivery of a 
substitute and the Utah Court must do the same as being the clear 
meaning of the statute. People v. Lechlinski, 131 Cal, Rptr, 
201, 60 Cal. App. 3d 766 (1976); People v, Medina, 103 Cal, Rptr, 
721, 27 Cal. App. 3d 473 (1972); People v. Ernst, 121 Cal. Rptr, 
857, 48 Cal. App. 3d 785 (1975), 
The State of Utah argued in the District Court in the above-
entitled case: 
MR. BARRY: Your Honor, if I may speak simply to 
defendant's contention. If you'd look at the Infor-
mation itself, you'll be able to read that the defend-
ant is charged with having knowingly and intentionally 
agreed or that he did knowingly and intentionally agree, 
offer, consent, arrange or negotiate to distribute for 
value marijuana, a Schedule I controlled substance. 
The crime we are involved here with is: Did he 
agree to sell it? Did he consent to sell it? Did he 
offer to sell it? It makes no sense at all to say the 
defendant is not guilty of this crime because he in 
fact delivered the marijuana. What's in marijuana 
itself shows in the delivery of the marijuana, shows 
itself that he meant it when he said: Yes, I'll sell 
you a hundred dollars worth of marijuana. The crime 
itself is the agreement to distribute the marijuana* 
Delivery of the marijuana shows that he did inten-
tionally make that agreement, that it was a true 
agreement and that he meant to follow through with 
it, your Honor, It makes no sense at all to claim: 
hey, I'm not really guilty because I actually gave 
him the marijuana after I got the money* That was 
evidence that there was in fact an agreement. 
The only way the defendant's contention could 
hold up would be in another scenario; for example, 
some party shows up and delivers the marijuana with 
whom none of the negotiations were made* The 
agreement in this case was made specifically between 
the undercover officers and this man, namely, that they 
would sell a hundred dollars worth of marijuana. 
THE COURT: What do you characterize as "distri-
buting for value," what constitutes that crime? 
MR. BARRY: This case could be charged either 
way, your Honor. (R. 69-70). 
The difficulty with the prosecution's approach of course is 
that by reading the so called "arranging statute" in such a way 
is that it virtually makes the remainder of Section 58-37-8, Utah 
Code Annotated (1953), as amended, superfluous. Such a reading 
would make the "arranging statute" overly broad, vague, uncertain 
and unintelligible and therefore unconstitutional. 
The possibilities are really endless. Is it a felony for a 
person to negotiate the sale of marijuana to himself from police? 
If so what is the purpose of the misdemeanor possession section of 
the code, Section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), Utah Code Annotated (1953), as 
amended? 
The State's position in the District Court was all that was 
necessary to prove the crime was "did [the defendant] agree to 
sell it." (R. 69). If this were the case and without more, the 
penalty revolves around what is offered for sale rather than what 
is sold. That is, if a person offers to sell marijuana, the 
penalty is different than the penalty for offering to sell 
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cocaine. And all the state would have to prove through the 
testimony of an officer was that a defendant agreed, consented, 
or offered to sell one controlled substance as opposed to 
another. No sale need even take place. How is a defendant 
supposed to defend against such a charge as a practical matter 
on such evidence? Does this mean if some eighteen year old 
defendant tells an officer on Center Street in Provo, Utah, where 
he can buy marijuana, that he is guilty of a third degree felony 
without more? 
Finally, since the resolution of this case does not involve 
a Federal or State constitutional issue, its application should 
be prospective only. Andrews v. Morris, 677 P.2d 81 (Utah 1981). 
It is the Respondents position that the Supreme Court 
should review its previous decisions regarding Section 58-37-8(1) 
(a)(iv), Utah Code Annotated, (1953), as amended, and rule as Judge 
Bullock did in State v. Jacobson, Fourth Judicial District Court, 
Utah County, State of Utah, Case No. 7062 hereto attached as 
Appendix "F" in order to avoid further confussion in the trial 
court* 
It is the Respondent's position that this ruling should be 
perspective and that the Supreme Court should set forth a rule in 
conformity with the case of State v. King, 564 P.2d 767 (Utah, 
1976). In the case of King, the defendant was convicted of the 
offense of selling marijuana, and the Court noted, "it is 
recognized that if a person is acting as a law enforcement 
officer or acts as agent in the sale or purchase of drugs as part 
of the law enforcement duties, he would not be guilty of the 
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offense charged. The test should be whether any defendant is 
acting knowingly or unknowingly as an agent for a police officer 
or acting as an agent for a person who is selling drugs. In the 
event a person is merely acting as an agent for the police, either 
knowingly or unknowingly, and does not gain thereby, he should not 
be convicted of a felony charge. On the other hand, in the event 
that a person is acting as a go-between or agent for a person who 
sells drugs he should obviously be convicted of a felony• However, 
while an individual defendant should not be applauded for telling 
third persons where they can obtain drugs, he should not be con-
victed of a felony unless he is actively involved. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court for its Order of Dismissal should be 
upheld and the Utah Supreme Court should reevaluate Section 
58-37-8(1)(a)(iv), Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended, in 
accordance with the foregoing in order to avoid further confusion 
in this matter. ^-t\A 
DATED this /^CJ^ pay of September, 1986. 
Attorney f0r\defendant-Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING^ 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies 
of the foregoing instrument to Mr« David L. Wilkinson, Attorney 
Gen^sa^l236 State Capital, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 
iy of September, 1986, postage prepaid. 
£REGORY M. ER 
ADDENDUM 
APPENDIX "A" 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PILED 
fuURIH^X'i; :>•%.• riv-
1333 JAN 29 ?!' 2 43 
*a 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK RENFRO, 
Defendant. 
REVISED MEMORANDUM 
DECISION.AND ORDER 
GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
REQUEST FOR DISMISSAL 
Case No. 9831 
This matter came regularly before the Court for trial 
on December 30, 1985. The defendant had waived his right to 
trial by jury; the trial was held before the bench. The State of 
Utah was represented by Deputy County Attorney Kent M. Barry, and 
the defendant was present and represented by counsel Gregory M. 
Warner. The Court heard the evidence presented by the State, the 
defendant offering no evidence and took the matter under 
advisement. The Court having reviewed the evidence and arguments 
of counsel, its previous memorandum decision, and having further 
reconsidered the motions and arguments of counsel, the Court 
hereby enters the following findings and makes the following 
order. 
FINDINGS 
1. The Court finds from the evidence shown that the 
Statefs witness, Jim Guynn, and another individual went to the 
defendant's house in Orem, Utah County , Utah, on March 28, 1985, 
for the purpose of purchasing marijuana. 
2. That while there, discussions were held, the 
results of which were that the officer gave two fifty dollar 
bills to the defendant in exchange for two small bags of 
marijuana, which the defendant retrieved from his bedroom inside 
the residence. 
3. The defendant was charged with the offense of 
Arranging to Distribute a Controlled Substance for Value, arid 
trial was held on that charge. After the parties had both rested 
their respective cases, the defendant moved to dismiss the charge 
because of the State's failure to charge Distribution of a 
Controlled Substance for Value, which he contended was the 
specific charge governing such conduct, and the State made no 
effort to amend the Information to that charge. 
4. The Court is persuaded that the evidence 
establishes conduct which is clearly in violation of the statutes 
of the State of Utah governing the Distribution for Value of 
Controlled Substances (Section 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii)), as defendant 
contends, and that the defendant should have been charged under 
that offense rather than with Arranging to Distribute a 
Controlled Substance for Value (Section 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv). 
ORDER 
Because of the State's failure to properly charge the 
defendant with the offense of Distribution for Value rather than 
Arranging, the Court grants the defendant's motion to dismiss and 
hereby orders that the charge against the defendant in this case, 
Arranging to Distribute a Controlled Substance for Value, be 
dismissed against this defendant and that he be discharged. 
2-
DATED this o2 7 day of January, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
.(Ztdfet. 
:<eT ci 
CULLEN/tfT CHRISTENSEN 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
APPENDIX "B" 
1 0 7 2 Cal. 357 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
PEOPLE, Respondent, 
v. 
Joseph BROWN, Appellant. 
Cr. 6655. 
Supreme Court of California 
In Bank. 
Dec. 22, 1060. 
Prosecution for offering to sell heroin. 
From adverse judgment of the Superior 
Court, Los Angeles County, William E. 
Fox, J., the defendant appealed. The Su-
preme Court held that admission by de-
fendant that he had the stuff and was on 
his way back but that the police rousted 
him and he had to get rid of it, plus absence 
of any evidence that his offer was false, 
was sufficient to sustain his conviction. 
Judgment and order denying motion 
for new trial affirmed. 
Opinion, 3 Cal.Rptr. 203, vacated. 
1. Poisons <S=>4 
In prosecution for offering to sell nar-
cotics, a specific intent to sell a narcotic is 
an essential clement of the crime of offer-
ing to make such a sale. West's Ann, 
Health & Safety Code, § 11501. 
2. Poisons <S=>4 
Statute making it a crime to offer to 
sell narcotics and to furnish a substitute 
does not encompass an offer to sell a nar-
cotic and the subsequent failure to deliver 
anything. West's Ann.Health & Safety 
Code, § 11503. 
3. Statutes C=2I6 
Legislative subcommittee's interpreta-
tion of an existing statute is not conclusive. 
4. Poisons <S=»4 
Under statute making it a crime to of-
fer to sell narcotics, the requirement of a 
direct, unequivocal act toward a sale neces-
sary for an attempt to make a sale is not an 
implied element of an offer to sell. West's 
Ann.Health & Safety Code, §§ 11500, 11501, 
11503. 
5. Poisons <S=>9 
In prosecution for offering to sell hero-
in, admission by defendant that he had the 
stuff and was on his way back but that the 
police rousted him and he had to get rid of 
it, plus absence of any evidence that his of-
fer was false, was sufficient to sustain his 
conviction. West's Ann.Health & Safety 
Code, §§ 11501, 11503. 
Gerald L. Rosen, Los Angeles, for appel-
lants. 
Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., and William 
E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent. 
PER CURIAM. 
The trial court, sitting without a jury, 
found defendant guilty of offering to sell 
narcotics in violation of section 11500 (now 
renumbered and hereafter called section 
11501) of the Health and Safety Code. I t 
also found that he was previously convicted 
of attempted robbery, denied his motion for 
new trial, and sentenced him to imprison-
ment in the state penitentiary for the term 
prescribed by law. Defendant appeals. 
The public defender represented defend* 
ant at the trial, but did not undertake to do 
so on appeal See Gov.Code, § 27706. De-
fendant requested the District Court of Ap-
peal, Second District, Division Three, in 
which the appeal was pending, to appoint 
an attorney to represent him, claiming that 
he was without funds to employ counsel. 
The court made an independent investiga-
tion of the record, determined that repre-
sentation by counsel would be of no benefit 
to defendant or to the court, and denied the 
request. See People v. Hyde, 51 Cal.2d 
152, 154, 331 P.2d 42. Defendant prepared 
and filed a brief in propria persona. The 
court affirmed the judgment. People v. 
Brown, Cal.App., 3 Cal.Rptr. 203. We 
granted defendant's petition for hearing in 
this court and appointed counsel to repre-
sent him. 
Officer Walton, an undercover narcotics 
agent, had arranged to buy heroin from an 
unidentified person and was awaiting deliv-
ery when defendant walked up to him and 
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asked if he were a policeman. He replied 
that he was not When defendant then 
asked him what he was waiting for, he re-
plied that he was expecting a delivery of 
heroin. Defendant then left 
While sitting in a bar the following 
afternoon, Officer Walton saw defendant on 
the street and called to him, and defendant 
entered the bar. Officer Walton testified: 
"I told him that I would like to know who 
put the jacket on me, meaning who said 
that I was a policeman; and the defendant 
stated that he couldn't tell me that, but that 
he didn't think I was a policeman because I 
didn't look the type and I told him that I 
wanted to get some stuff, meaning heroin; 
and he stated that he could get it for me 
but if I turned him in, well, the people 
around that area would know who burned 
him—meaning had him arrested." Officer 
Walton told defendant that he did not want 
to get burned again, meaning that he did 
not want to part with his money without 
receiving narcotics in return. Defendant 
answered that if Officer Walton wanted 
"it," he would have to take some risks. 
Officer Walton then gave defendant $9 and 
defendant left Officer Walton waited for 
some time, but defendant did not return. 
He saw defendant again three or four 
days later and asked him why he had not 
returned to the bar. Defendant answered 
"that he had it and he was on his way back 
but the police rousted him and he had to get 
rid of i t" He again encountered defendant 
about a week and a half later and called to 
him u[t]hat was a pretty dirty deal you 
I. Section 11501 provides: "[e]xccpt as 
otherwise provided in this division, every 
person who transports, imports into tins 
State, sells, furnishes, administers or 
gives away, or offers to transport im-
port into this State, sell, furnish, admin-
ister, or give away, or attempts to im-
port into this State or transport any 
narcotic other than marijuana except 
upon the written prescription of a physi-
cian, dentist chiropodist, or veterinarian 
licensed to practice in this State shall 
be punished by imprisonment in the coun-
ty jail for not more than one year, or in 
the state prison from five years to life. 
pulled on me the other day." Defendant 
replied that he would speak to him later. 
He did not see defendant again until his 
arrest Defendant did not deliver heroin 
or any other substance to Officer Walton 
in return for the $9. 
[1] In his briefs filed in the District 
Court of Appeal, defendant contends that a 
specific intent to sell narcotics is an essen-
tial element of the crime of offering to sell 
narcotics under section 11501 of the Health 
and Safety Code1 and that this intent can-
not be inferred from the making of the of-
fer alone. He asserts that, the making of 
such an offer is equally attributable to an 
intent to obtain money by false pretenses. 
His counsel makes the additional contention 
that by proscribing offers to sell the Legis-
lature in effect proscribed one form of at-
tempts to sell and that therefore we must 
look to the law of attempts to determine 
whether an oral offer to sell constitutes an 
attempt to sell. He asserts that the oral 
offer and the taking of the money were only 
preparation to making a sale and that nei-
ther was a direct, unequivocal act toward a 
sale. See People v. Gallardo, 41 Cal2d 57, 
66, 257 P.2d 29, and cases cited. Since in 
his view such an act is an essential element 
of the corpus delicti of an offer to sell with-
in the meaning of section 11501, it cannot 
be proved by defendant's extrajudicial ad-
mission standing alone that "he had it and 
he was on his way back but the police roust-
ed him and he had to get rid of it." See 
People v. Duncan, 51 Cal.2d 523, 528, 334 
P.2d 858; People v. McMonigle, 29 Cal.2d 
730, 738, 177 P.2d 745. 
"If such a person has been previously 
convicted of any offense described in this 
division or has been previously convicted 
of any offense under the laws of any 
other state or of the United States which 
if committed in this State would have 
been punishable as an offense described in 
this division, the previous conviction shall 
be charged in the indictment or informa-
tion and if found to be true by the jury, 
upon a jury trial, or if found to be true 
by the court, upon a court trial, or is 
admitted by the defendant, he shall be 
imprisoned in the state pnsuu from 10 
years to life." 
357 P 2d—63 
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Both defendant's and his counsel's con-
tentions are consistent with the position 
taken by the Subcommittee on Narcotics of 
the Assembly Interim Committee of the 
Judiciary in 19S3 when it proposed the 
adoption of two new sections of the Health 
and Safety Code, only one of which was en-
acted. Section 11503 makes it a crime to 
offer to sell a narcotic and then deliver a 
substitute.2 Proposed section 11509 (sec-
tion 10 of Assembly Bill No. 2243, 1953 
Session) would have made it a crime to 
offer to sell a narcotic coupled with the ac-
ceptance of money, even though there was 
no delivery of anything.3 
[2] In recommending the passage of 
section 11503, the Subcommittee stated: 
"[this section] will be entirely new law. 
This will cover the individual who agrees to 
sell, furnish, transport, or give away any 
narcotic, and then delivers some other 
liquid, substance or material. These indi-
viduals are known to be in a position to 
violate the law; but, for some reason, they 
may feel that they are dealing with a law 
enforcement officer and thus deliver tobac-
co, water, or some other substance with the 
result that they have had the intent to com-
mit the crime but are testing out the officer. 
At the present time nothing can be done to 
that pcison, except to charge [him] with 
'bunco' Under this statute, it provides a 
penalty of not more than one year in the 
county jail or in the state prison for 10 
years " The Subcommittee thus made clear 
2. Section 11503 provides that "[c]very 
person who agrees, consents, or m any 
manner offers to unlawfully sell, furnish, 
transport, administer, or give away any 
narcotic to any person, or offers, ar-
ranges, or negotiates to have any nar-
cotic unlawfully sold, delivered, trans-
ported, furnished, administered, or given 
to any person and then sells, delivers, 
furuibhes, transports, administers, or 
gi\es, or offers arranges, or negoti ites 
to ha\e sold delivered, transported, fur-
nished, administered, or given to any per-
son any other liquid, substance, or ma-
terial in lieu of anv naieotic sh ill bo 
punished bv impnsoment in the county 
jail for not more than one -soar or in 
the state prison for not more than 10 
years " 
its view that section 11501 did not encom-
pass an offer to sell a narcotic and subse-
quent delivery of a substitute. A fortiori 
it would not encompass an otter to sell a 
narcotic and subsequent failure to deliver 
anything, which proposed section 11509 en-
visaged. 
[3] Whether the Subcommittee's view 
was based on the theory that an offer alone 
to sell a narcotic is insufficient evidence of 
a specific intent to make such a sale or on 
the theory that offer means attempt and 
that some additional act is required to con-
stitute an attempt does not appear In any 
event, the Subcommittee's interpretation of 
the existing statute is not conclusive. Even 
if it is assumed that by enacting section 
11503 the Legislature impliedly excluded 
the conduct therein proscribed from the 
more inclusive language of section 11501, 
it did not affect the scope of section 11501 
in relation to defendant's conduct m this 
case. 
[4, 5] We agree with defendant's con-
tention that a specific intent to sell a nar-
cotic is an essential element of the crime of 
offering to make such a sale under section 
11501. See Pen Code, § 20; Matter of 
Yun Quong, 159 Cal. 508, 514-515, 114 P. 
835, People v. Winston, 46 Cal 2d 151, 
158; People v. Vogel, 46 Cal 2d 798, 801, 
299 P 2d 850. In view, however, of defend-
ant's subsequent admission that "he had 
[the stuff] and he was on his way back but 
3. Proposed section 11500, as amended 
March 9, 1953, read "[ojvery person 
^ho agrees, consents, or in anv manner 
offers, to sell, deliver, furnish, transport, 
administer, or give, or arranges or ne-
gotiates to have sold, delivered, fur-
nished, transported, administered, or 
given to any person any narcotic in vio-
lation of any provision of this division 
and accepts any money, thing of value, or 
other consideration in full or partial pay-
moit is guilty of a felon}, and upon con-
viction thereof shall be confined in the 
county lail for not less than 60 days nor 
more than one >tar, or in the state pris-
on for not more than 5 years " 
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the police rousted him and he had to get rid 
of it," and the absence of any compelling 
evidence that defendant's offer was false, 
the trial court could reasonably conclude 
that defendant meant what he said when he 
stated to the officer that for $9 "he would 
get it for me. * * * He would get the 
stuff for me." Moreover, there is nothing 
in section 11501 to support the contention 
that an offer to sell means an attempt to 
sell, for it proscribes both "offers to trans-
port, import into this State, sell, furnish, 
administer or give away" and "attempts to 
import into this State or transport any nar-
cotic * * *." By thus distinguishing bc-
I. The problem has attracted nation-wide 
attention. The subcommittee to study 
defender systems of the Association of 
the Bar of the City of New York and 
the National Legal Aid Association con-
cluded in their report. Equal Justice for 
the Accused 61 (Doubleday, 1059) that 
"[i]n addition to affording early repre-
sentation, any defender system should 
make provision for the continuance of 
representation through appeal in appro-
priate cases. An appeal when grounds 
exist is an inseparable part of the proc-
ess through which the individual's guilt 
or innocence of the charges brought 
against him by the state is established. 
Counsel is needed to assist with the de-
termination of whether an appeal should 
be taken and, if an appeal is taken, to 
prepare and present it." 
State practice varies. Two states re-
quire the appointment of counsel on ap-
peal in all felony cases. (Indiana: State 
ex rel. White v. Hilgcmann, 218 Ind. 572, 
578, 34 N.E.2d 129; State ex rel. Grecco 
•. Allen Circuit Court, 238 Ind. 571, 
575, 153 N.E.2d 914; Wisconsin: Wis. 
Stat Ann. § 957.2G(3), [if the court is 
satisfied that "review is sought in good 
faith and upon reasonable grounds"].) 
In New York the appointment of counsel 
on appeals turns upon whether the in-
digent defendant has a copy of the trial 
minutes. If he does, no counsel is ap-
pointed (People v. Brcslin, 4 N.Y.2d 73, 
80-87, 172 N.Y.S.2d 157, 149 N.E.2d 85); 
otherwise appointment is mandatory 
(People v. Kalan, 2 N.Y.2d 278, 280, 
159 N.Y.S.2d 480, 140 N.E.2d 357; Peo-
ple v. Pitts, 6 N.Y.2d 288, 292-293, 189 
N.Y.S.2d G50, 1G0 N.E.2d 523). Wyo-
ming places discretion in the Supreme 
Court to appoint counsel for indigent de-
fendants "in any criminal matter or pro-
ceeding before said supreme court" 
twecn offers and attempts the Legislature 
made clear that the requirement of a direct, 
unequivocal act toward a sale necessary for 
an attempt to make a sale is not an implied 
element of an offer to sell. 
The judgment and the order denying the 
motion for new trial are affirmed. 
TRAYNOR, Justice (concurring). 
I concur in the judgment It is my opin-
ion, however, that the holding in People v. 
Hyde, 51 Cal.2d 152, 154, 331 P.2d 42, 
should be expanded to require the appoint-
ment of counsel on appeal for all indigent 
defendants convicted of felonies.1 
Wyo.Stats.1957 § 7-8. Several states 
appoint counsel at the trial who has dis-
cretion to appeal at public expense. 
(Connecticut: State v. Klein, 95 Conn. 
451, 453, 112 A. 524 [public defender]; 
State v. Zukauskas, 132 Conn. 450, 451-
452, 45 A.2d 289 note; Iowa: Iowa 
Code Ann. tit 36 § 775.5 (1959 Pocket 
Part), Tomlinson v. Monroe County, 134 
Iowa 608, 610, 112 N.W. 100; Michigan: 
Mich.StatAnn. § 28.1254, CompXaws 
1948, 8 775.17; Minnesota: Minn.Stat 
Ann. § 611.07, subd. 2 (1959 Pocket 
Part) [Review must be sought "in good 
faith and upon reasonable grounds/' 
The provision may apply only when trial 
counsel was appointed by the court, cf. 
State v. Coursolle, 255 Minn. 384, 390, 
97 N.W.2d 472]; Mississippi: Miss.Code 
Ann.1942 § 2505 [capital cases only]; 
Nevada: Nev.Rev.Stat. §5 177.065, subd. 
2, 7.260; Pennsylvania: Penn.Stat.Ann. 
tit. 19 § 1232.) Other states require ap-
pointment of counsel on appeal only in 
capital cases. (Alabama: Ala.Code tit. 
15 § 382(5) (1955 Pocket Part), [ap-
plied but not discussed in Monk v. State, 
258 Ala. 603, 64 So.2d 588]; Florida: 
Fla.StatAnn. § 909.21 (1959 Pocket 
Part), [applied, McNeal v. Culver, Fla., 
113 So.2d 381, 383]; Georgia: Ga.Code 
Ann. § 27-3002 (1958 Pocket Part); Il-
linois: Ill.Itev.Stat.1959, ch. 38 § 730a; 
Kansas: Gen.Stat of Kan. § 62-1304 
(1959 Supp.) (first degree murder only); 
Nebraska: Rev.Stat. of Neb.1943 S§ 29-
1803, 29-1804 (1959 Cum.Supp.); North 
Carolina: Gen.Stat of No.Cur. § 15-181; 
Oklahoma: Noel v. State, 17 Okl.Cr. 
308, 318-322, 188 P. 688; Oregon: Ore. 
Rev.Stat § 138.420 (1959 Replacement); 
cf. Anonymous, 76 Me. 207 (1st case, 
1884).) Three states refuse to appoint 
counsel on appeal. Rhode Island: State 
v. Hudson, 55 R.I. 141, 153, 179 A. 130, 
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The question calls for resolution even 
though we appointed counsel to represent 
defendant in this court. The question can-
not remain in abeyance. This very case 
illustrates the recurring practice of the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, Second District, Di-
vision Three, of referring the question of 
the appointment of counsel to the local bar 
association committee (see People v. Logan, 
137 Cal.App.2d 331, 332, 290 P.2d 11) and 
the consequent countervailing practice of 
this court to then grant a hearing, even on 
its own motion, whenever there has been no 
appointment of counsel. There would be 
no end to such wasteful procedure were the 
question deemed moot each time this court 
granted a hearing and appointed counsel. 
The question should be settled in the inter-
est of effective appellate court administra-
tion. See Almassy v. L. A. County Civil 
Service Com., 34 Cal.2d 387, 390, 210 P.2d 
503; Walling v. Mutual Wholesale Food 
& Supply Co., 8 Cir., 141 F2d 331, 334-
335; People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 
411 111. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769, 772, 30 A.L. 
R.2d 1132; State ex rel. Smith v. Smith, 
197 Or. 96, 252 P.2d 550, 563; 103 U. of 
Pa.L.Rev. 772, 783, 787-793; 132 A.L.R. 
1185, 1186. 
In Griffin v. People of State of Illinois, 
351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.E& 891, the 
Supreme Court of the United States held 
that a state may not deny to a defendant, 
on the sole ground that he cannot pay for 
it, a stenographic transcript of the trial 
proceedings when it is essential to effective 
appellate review. The court declared that 
although there is no constitutional right 
to appeal, "that is not to say that a State 
that does grant appellate review can do so 
in a way that discriminates against some 
convicted defendants on account of their 
poverty. Appellate review has now become 
an integral part of the Illinois trial system 
for finally adjudicating the guilt or inno-
cence of a defendant. Consequently at all 
stages of the proceedings the Due Process 
100 A.L.R. 313, followed, Lee v. Kinde-
lan, 80 R.I. 212, 217-218, 95 A.2d 51, 
certiorari denied, 345 U.S. 1000, 73 S.Ct 
1146, 140<j; Tennessee: State ex rel. 
Fisher v. Bomar, 201 Tenn. 579, 581, 
and Equal Protection Clauses protect per-
sons like petitioners from invidious dis-
criminations." Id., 351 U.S. at page 18, 
76 S.Ct. at page 590. 
Although this holding establishes only the 
right to a transcript, it indicates the Su-
preme Court's concern to protect indigent 
defendants against discriminatory conse-
quences of their poverty. Denial of counsel 
on appeal would seem to be a discrimination 
at least as invidious as that condemned in 
Griffin v. People of State of Illinois, supra. 
See State v. Delaney, Or., 332 P.2d 71, 74-
81; The Effect of Griffin v. People of State 
of Illinois on the States' Administration 
of the Criminal Law, 25 U. of Chi.L.Rey. 
161, 170-171; Appointment of Counsel for 
Indigent Defendants in Criminal Appeals, 
1959 Duke L.J. 484, 488-489. We need not 
determine this constitutional question, how-
ever, for there are adequate independent 
grounds for the conclusion that appellate 
courts must appoint counsel on appeal for 
all indigent defendants convicted of felon-
ies. 
Appointment of counsel is essential to 
minimize hazards of affirming an erroneous 
judgment, particularly in view of Rule 33 
of the Rules on Appeal. This rule defines 
"normal record" on appeal and "additional 
record." If the defendant wants the record 
on appeal to include matters that are part of 
the "additional record," he must file "with 
his notice of appeal an application describ-
ing the material which he desires to have in-
cluded and the points on which he intends 
to rely which make it proper to include it" 
It is unreasonable to expect the average in-
digent defendant without counsel to obtain 
an adequate record on appeal. He would 
ordinarily be incarcerated, without access 
to the trial court's files, and cut off from 
consultation with his trial defense counsel, 
the trial judge, the prosecutor, and other 
witnesses to the trial. He would probably 
be without access to law books and unable 
300 S.W.2d 927; Texas: Spalding v. 
State, 137 Tex.Cr. 329, 334, 127 S.W.2d 
457; cf. State v. Singletary, 187 S.C. 19, 
28, 196 S.B. 527.) 
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to designate points that make it proper to 
include an additional record. He would 
probably be unaware of Rule 33, or so un-
familiar with it that he would fail to realize 
that the normal record does not include rul-
ings on motions, the voir dire examination 
of jurors, the opening statements and ar-
guments to the jury, comments on the evi-
dence by the trial judge, instructions given 
or refused, and rulings on the admissibility 
of exhibits. He would not be alert, as 
would an attorney, to possible reversible 
errors therein even when they amounted to 
a denial of constitutional rights. (See Peo-
ple v. Barrett, 207 Cal. 47, 49, 276 P. 1003, 
[manner in which the trial judge conducted 
the voir dire examination of the jurors 
amounted to a denial of the constitutional 
right to trial by jury].) 
Even a court cannot make an adequate 
review on less than the whole record. A 
fortiori, an attorney called upon by a local 
bar association and unknown to defendant 
o r trial counsel cannot evaluate the merits 
of an appeal on less than the whole record. 
It is unpredictable how far an appellate 
•court would advance toward a determina-
tion of the merits of an appeal by ordering 
the preparation and transmission to it of 
the whole record. In any event, it would 
.then vitiate Rule 33, designed to avoid prep-
aration and review of nonessential parts 
of the record. 
An appellate court can no more appropri-
ately judge whether there is error requir-
ing reversal without the benefit of counsel 
than a trial court can decide the issues at 
the trial without benefit of counsel. See 
Kopasz v. Kopasz, 34 Cal.2d 423, 425, 210 
P.2d 846. How then can it determine that 
there is no error requiring appointment 
of counsel? How can it undertake to dis-
pense with counsel for indigents when it 
is not free to dispense with counsel for 
those who can afford them ? A court docs 
not suddenly become omniscient when the 
appellant proves impecunious. Thus in 
People v. Tahtinen, 50 Cal.2d 127, 323 P.2d 
442, this court was divided on the merits, 
yet the attorney to whom the record was 
referred by the local bar association com-
mittee at the instigation of the District 
Court of Appeal thought there was no rea-
sonable basis for an appeal, and that court 
accordingly denied defendant's request for 
appointment of counsel. In the present 
case that court rejected the attorney's rec-
ommendation for appointment of counsel, 
declaring that the appeal was "without [a] 
semblance of merit." 3 Cal.Rptr. 203, 205. 
Yet this court, after ordering a hearing 
and appointing counsel, now finds that 
there are substantial legal issues demand-
ing careful research and analysis that 
demonstrate the risk of fallibility of judg-
ment without benefit of counsel's advo-
cacy. 
Moreover, appointment of counsel pro-
motes effective appellate court administra-
tion. Denied counsel, defendants frequent-
ly file briefs in propria persona raising is-
sues of little or no merit that still require 
the Attorney General's answer and the 
court's consideration. Often when a Dis-
trict Court of Appeal affirms the judgment, 
a defendant files a petition for hearing in 
this court that does not comply with Rules 
28 and 29, which presuppose an orderly 
presentation of the case before the District 
Court of Appeal. When a defendant is 
incapable of making such a presentation, 
this court has a correspondingly heavy bur-
den in reviewing his petition. 
The court as well as defendant is more 
likely to benefit from oral argument, as well 
as from briefs presented by counsel rather 
than by defendant in propria persona. 
Moreover, the first alternative also avoids 
possible complications of habeas corpus and 
the transportation of defendant under 
guard. There is no reason to forego these 
advantages of argument by counsel, partic-
ularly when the defendant might be driven 
to the second alternative to secure his right 
to oral argument on appeal implicit in Rules 
22 and 28(f) of the Rules on Appeal. Met-
ropolitan Water Dist. of Southern Cali-
fornia v. Adams, 19 Cal.2d 463, 467-468, 122 
P.2d 257; see Pen.Code, § 1253; Witkin, 
New California Rules on Appeal, 17 So.Cal. 
L.Rev. 232, 243-244. 
1078 Cal. S57 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
The problem is not averted merely be-
cause Government Code, § 27706 makes it 
the duty of the public defender to prosecute 
appeals "where, in his opinion, the appeal 
will or might reasonably be expected to 
result in the reversal or modification of the 
judgment of conviction." Comparable dis-
cretion vested in federal district judges is 
subject to appellate review, and counsel 
must be appointed to assist the defendant 
in showing that his appeal has merit. John-
son v. United States, 352 U.S. 565, 566, 77 
S.Ct. 550, 1 L.Ed.2d 593; see also Eskridge 
v. Washington Prison Board, 357 U.S. 214, 
78 S.Ct. 1061, 2 L.Ed.2d 1269; Farley v. 
United States, 354 U.S. 521, 522-523, 77 S. 
Ct. 1371, 1 L.Ed.2d 1529; see also People 
v. Kalan, 2 N.Y.2d 278, 159 N.Y.S.2d 480, 
140 N.E.2d 357, 358; State ex rel. White v. 
Hilgemann, 218 Ind. 572, 34 N.E.2d 129, 
131. Moreover, it sometimes happens that 
defendants who were able to retain counsel 
at the trial are indigent at the time of ap-
peal. It would be capricious to make a de-
fendant's right to appointment of counsel 
on appeal depend on the chance that he was 
represented by the public defender at the 
trial. 
In the interest, therefore, of orderly as 
well as just review an appellate court 
should appoint counsel upon the request of 
an indigent defendant convicted of a felony. 
Any implications to the contrary in People 
v. Hyde, 51 Cal.2d 152, 154, 331 P.2d 42; 
People v. Logan, 137 Cal.App.2d 331, 332-
333, 290 P2d 11; People v. McGrory, 137 
Cal.App.2d 723f 724, 291 P.2d 43; People v. 
Hamm, 145 Cal.App.2d 242, 244, 302 P.2d 
345; and People v. Slater, 152 Cal.App. 
2d 814, 815-816, 313 P2d 111, should be 
disapproved. 
Of course appointed counsel should not 
present frivolous anneals. See, Ellis v. 
United States, 356 U.S. 674, 675, 78 S.Ct. 
974, 2 L.Ed.2d 1060, discussed in Ercnhaft, 
Indigent Appellants in the Federal Courts, 
46 A.B.AJ. 616, 647; State ex rel. White 
v. Hilgemann, 218 Ind. 572, 57&-579, 34 
2. In the two-week period from July 25, 
1960 to August 5, I960, this court de-
nied seven petitions for habeas corpus 
N.E.2d 129. It is for counsel to make a 
reasonable investigation, ordinarily involv-
ing consultation with the defendant, to iin~ 
sure consideration of meritorious grounds 
of appeal. See United States v. Sevilk; 2 
Cir., 174 F.2d 879, 880. Should he then 
conclude that the appeal is frivolous, he 
should so advise the court and the defend-
ant He need not proceed with the appeal; 
should the defendant insist on proceeding 
with it, the court need not appoint new 
counsel. People v. Tabb, 156 Cal.App2d 
467, 471-472, 319 P.2d 656. 
The reasons for appointment of counsel 
on appeal from judgments of conviction !do 
not extend to habeas corpus or other collat-
eral attacks on final judgments of convic-
tion unless the defendant presents a prima 
facie case for relief. "This procedural re-
quirement does not place upon an indigent 
prisoner who seeks to raise questions
 :of 
the denial of fundamental rights in propria 
persona any burden of complying with tech-
nicalities ; it simply demands of him> a 
measure of frankness in disclosing his tac-
tual situation." In re Swain, 34 Cal2d 300, 
304, 209 P.2d 793, 796. Our reluctancoto 
consider even constitutional question*t^ on 
habeas corpus if they could have teen 
raised on appeal (see In re Dixon, 41 CaL2d 
756, 759-761, 264 P.2d 513) makes it ai**he 
more important to afford defendants affair 
opportunity to challenge their convictions 
on appeal. 
Appointment of counsel on appeal should 
reduce applications for post-conviction rem-
edies in the federal courts as well as our 
own.* As the report of July 5, 1960, of the 
Habeas Corpus Committee of the National 
Association of Attorneys General points 
out, the states can largely obviate reviewrof 
their decisions in criminal cases by federal 
district courts on habeas corpus petitions by 
providing adequate state remedies. 
This discussion is limited to felonies be-
cause of the substantially less serious nature 
of misdemeanors and their correspondingly 
lighter penalties. See Pen.Code, §§ 17-19U. 
from the same prisoner, who had taken 
his appeal in propria persona. 
PEOPLE v. BROWN Cal. 1079 
Cite as 357 P.2d 1072 
The misdemeanant suffers no loss of civil 
rights. See Pen.Code, §§ 2600, 2601. He is 
entitled to bail as a matter of right after 
conviction pending appeal. Pen.Code, § 
1272. Any incarceration is likely to be 
brief. Frequently a misdemeanant is penal-
ized only by fine, often payable in install-
ments. See Pen.Code, § 1205. The court 
may grant probation summarily (Pen.Code, 
§ 1203b) to the misdemeanant or permit him 
to serve time on weekends or at times when 
he is not working. With earning capacity 
thus maintained he may be able to employ 
-counsel. Most misdemeanants are willing 
to forfeit bail or pay the fines and find it 
unnecessary to employ counsel or request 
trial. There is hence not the urgency for 
making appointment of counsel on appeal 
for indigent misdemeanants mandatory in-
stead of discretionary. 
PETERS and DOOLING, JJ., concur. 
SCHAUER, Justice (concurring). 
I concur only in the judgment. I am 
impelled to point out that the discussion, in 
the opinion by the court (at page 817 
of 9 Cal.Rptr., at page 1073 of 357 P.2d), of 
purported interpretation of section 11501 of 
the Health and Safety Code by the 1953 
proposal of legislation, expression of views 
by an assembly subcommittee, and adoption 
of section 11503 (former section 11502, en-
acted in 1953) by the Legislature, is neither 
necessary nor appropriate. The argument 
concerning these matters was not advanced 
either by defendant in pro. per. or by coun-
sel appointed for him, but originated in this 
court. The notion that these matters which 
occurred in 1953 could evidence what the 
Legislature meant when it created the crime 
of offering to sell a contraband narcotic in 
1909 l appears to me so obviously lacking in 
merit as not to warrant inclusion in an ap-
pellate opinion; rather, such notion appears 
4. I?y a 1JM>9 amendment of section 8 of the 
1007 Poison Act the Legislature for the 
first time made it unlawful to "offer to 
sell, furnish or give away" narcotics ex-
cept under certain conditions. Stats. 
1909, ch. 1*79, § 4. Since then each of 
to be stated for no other purpose than to 
refute it. 
The contention made by counsel appoint-
ed for defendant by this court—that the 
word "offer" in section 11501 means "at-
tempt" as defined by the law of crimes—is 
in effect a more sophisticated version of the 
argument advanced by defendant in pro. 
per. before the District Court of Appeal, 
Second District, Division Three. That 
court, speaking through Presiding Justice 
Shinn (People v. Brown (1960, Cal.App.), 
3 Cal.Rptr. 203, 204, 205), stated defend-
ant's contention as made in pro. per. as fol-
lows : "that the word 'offer' should be con-
strued to mean 'bring, bear, or carry/ and 
since it was not even shown there was a 
narcotic in existence which could have been 
the subject of an offer, commission of the 
charged offense was not proved." Without 
in so many words rejecting defendant's con-
tention as to the meaning of "offer," the 
District Court of Appeal correctly held that 
"Appellant's [defendant's] statement that 
he had 'it' was sufficient as proof that the 
heroin was in his possession and that he had 
the ability to perform his promise." 
Now this court, after lengthy considera-
tion of this simple case, comes to the same 
conclusion as to the sufficiency of the evi-
dence—the only possible conclusion under 
any normal theory of appellate review. 
The only contribution to the law in the 
opinion by the court is the decision that the 
Legislature, when it proscribed both "of-
fers" and "attempts," referred to two dif-
ferent sorts of criminal conduct. 
In the circumstances it is obvious that the 
District Court of Appeal properly deter-
mined, on the basis of its own examination 
of the record, that "representation by coun-
sel would be of no benefit to the appellant or 
to the court" and correctly held that "There 
is no merit in the appeal." (People v. 
the series of acts which have denounced 
narcotics offenses hafl contained a provi-
sion similar to that of such amended sec-
tion 8 or the comparable provision of 
the here pertinent section 11501 of the 
Health and Safety Code. 
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Brown (1960, Cal.App.), supra, 3 Cal.Rptr. 
203, 204.) 
It seems proper to note that the majority 
"By the Court" opinion states (at page 
816 of 9 Cal.Rptr., at page 1072 of 357 P.2d) 
that "Defendant requested the District 
Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 
Three, in which the appeal was pending, to 
appoint an attorney to represent him, claim-
ing that he was without funds to employ 
counsel. The court made an independent in-
vestigation of the record, determined that 
representation by counsel would be of no 
benefit to defendant or to the court, and de-
nied the request. (See People v. Hyde, 51 
Cal.2d 152, 154, 331 P.2d 42.) • * * 
We granted defendant's petition for hear-
ing in this court and appointed counsel 
to represent him." 
It appears proper to note also that the 
concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Traynor 
states (at page 819 of 9 Cal.Rptr., at page 
1075 of 357 P.2d), "I concur in the judg-
ment. It is my opinion, however, that the 
holding in People v. Hyde, 51 Cal.2d 152, 
154, 331 P.2d 42, should be expanded to re-
quire the appointment of counsel on appeal 
for all indigent defendants convicted of fel-
onies." 
"The question calls for resolution even 
though we appointed counsel to represent 
defendant in this court. The question can-
not remain in abeyance. This very case il-
lustrates the recurring practice of the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, Second District, 
Division Three, of referring the question of 
the appointment of counsel to the local bar 
association committee (see People v. Logan, 
137 Cal.App.2d 331, 332, 290 P.2d 11) and 
the consequent countervailing practice of 
this court to then grant a hearing, even on 
its own motion, whenever there has been 
no appointment of counsel. There would 
be no end to such wasteful procedure were 
the question deemed moot each time this 
court granted a hearing and appointed 
counsel. The question should be settled in 
the interest of effective appellate court ad-
ministration." 
It seems appropriate further to note that 
the question was settled by the holding in 
People v. Hyde (1958), 51 Cal.2d 152, 154 
[1] , 331 P.2d 42 and that the District Court 
of Appeal in the present case complied with 
that holding. 
From what has been quoted above from 
the opinions of the majority and of Justice 
Traynor it appears proper to infer that the 
granting of a hearing in the case at bench 
was influenced at least in part by the view 
of the specially concurring justice. If such 
inference is properly drawn it seems ob-
viously appropriate to observe that although 
counsel appointed by this court performed 
his duties faithfully and ably, the appoint-
ment of an attorney for the defendant has 
not aided such defendant or furthered the 
proper administration of justice. The only 
thing which the granting of a hearing ac-
complished has been a delay in final deter-
mination of this case and additional ex-
pense to the state. 
McCOMB, J., concurs. 
O I MY NUMWt SYSTtM> 
In re Larry Wayne McLAIN, on 
Habeas Corpus. 
Cr. 6714. 
Supreme Court of California, 
In Bank. 
Dec. 27, I960. 
Rehearing Denied Jan. 25,1961. 
Proceeding on habeas corpus by state 
prisoner claiming that he is being illegally 
retained. The Supreme Court, Peters, J., 
held that where Adult Authority had pre-
viously fixed prisoner's term at 7 years and 
granted probation at a time to commence 
in future but subsequently revoked prior 
action because based on record before Au-
thority prisoner had been found guilty 
of complicity in knifing of fellow prisoner, 
good cause was shown for revocation of 
both parole and prior sentence, and such 
sentence until Authority fixed it at a lesser 
APPENDIX "C" 
§ 1 1 3 5 1 UNIFORM CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES Div. 10 
Note 48 
ciimstii i iccs bave been futile in prosecution Refusal to permit •lffoii«lniil*s to emifm-
for possess ion oi heroin for sale nml pos- vert farts rHieil upon hv prosecution to 
sess ion of marijuana. People v. Zavala justify issuance of search warrant u*ei| to 
(1!HI(I) 4!) Cnl.Hptr. 11511. 2TUI <\A.2«1 T.'I'J. obtain iiicritniuatiiij: evidence UMM! against 
defendants in prosecution for possess ing 
, . . . , , lirroin for sale w a s error requiring icver 
l-.ven though defendant, who pleaded
 s ; | | < , . | | | t y | v , ( . r M n I I (UMiTo 4'A f : . l . 
guilty to cr ime of possess ing heroin, s l ip- | ( . , | r # 157. 2X\ <* A.LM 4M|. 
tiltifofl that court could determine lit t ime 
of probation nml Hcntcticc hearing whether Police off icer's reference in presence of 
possess ion admitted by defendant wits for jury lo sale of narcotics by defendant 
purpose of sale , it was improper for charged with posses s ing narcotics was tint 
eourt , apparent ly acting upon material prejudicial ami did not deny defendant fair 
contained in probation report, to "find" trial in view of farts that defense first 
defendant guilty of more ser ious crime of elicited reference to sell ing narcotics from 
possess ion for purposes of sale. People officer ami then pursued the subject. 
v. B r a v o (1JKI5) 4<1 Cnl.Itptr. 1121, 237 C. People v. Kstrada (IWITO 41 ('al.Hptr. 
A.2d 4.'n. iari, 2.u (\A.2«I i;:«. n A.I*K.:UI I:U>-. 
§ 1 1 3 5 2 . Transportation, sale, giving away, etc. of designated 
controlled substances; punishment; prior convic-
tions 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this division, every person 
who transports, imports into this state, sells, furnishes, administers, 
or gives away, or offers to transport, import into this state, sell, fur-
nish, administer, or give away, or attempts to import into this state 
or transport (1) any controlled substance specified in subdivision (b) 
or (c) of Section 11054, specified in paragraph (11), (12), or (17) of 
subdivision (d) of Section 11054, or specified in subdivision (b) or 
(c) of Section 11055, or (2) any controlled substance classified in 
Schedule III, IV, or V which is a narcotic drug, unless upon the writ-
ten prescription of a physician, dentist, podiatrist, or veterinarian li-
censed to practice in this state, shall be punished by imprisonment in 
the state prison for a period of five years to life and shall not be eli-
gible for release upon completion of sentence or on parole or any oth-
er basis until he has been imprisoned for a period of not less than 
three years in the state prison. 
(b) If such person has been previously convicted once of any of-
fense described in subdivision (d), the previous conviction shall be 
charged in the indictment or information and, if found to be true by 
the jury upon a jury trial or by the court upon a court trial or if ad-
mitted by the person, he shall be imprisoned in the state prison for a 
period of 10 years to life and shall not be eligible* for release upon 
completion of sentence or on parole* or any other basis until he has 
l>oen imprisoned for a period of not less than 10 years in the state 
prison. 
(c) If such person has been previously convicted two or more 
times of any offense described in subdivision (d), the previous convic-
tions shall be charged in the indictment or information and, if found 
to be true by the jury upon a jury trial or b\ the court upon a court 
trial or if admitted by the person, he shall be imprisoned in the state 
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prison for a period of 15 years to life and shall not be eligible for re-
lease upon completion of sentence or on parole or any other basis un-
til he has been imprisoned for a period of not less than 15 years in 
the state prison. 
(d) Any previous conviction of any of the following offenses, or 
of an offense under the laws of another state or of the United States 
which, if committed in this state, would have been punishable as such 
an offense, shall be charged pursuant to subdivision (b) or (c) of this 
section: 
(1) Any felony offense described in Section 11378, 11379, or 
31380. 
(2) Any felony offense described in this division involving a con-
trolled substance specified in subdivision (b) or (c) of Section 11054, 
specified in paragraph (10), (11), (12), or (17) of subdivision (d) of 
Section 11054, or specified in subdivision (b) or (c) of Section 11055. 
(3) Any felony offense described in this division involving a nar-
cotic drug classified in Schedule III, IV, or V. 
(Addtni by Stats.1972, c. 14U7, p. 3013, § 3. Amended by Stats.1073. c. 
1078, p. 2173, § 4, efi*. Oct. 1, 11)73.) 
Historical Note 
I tesci i tc i ic iu; ; f«»r violat ions between amended l»y Stats.1iH»1, c. *J1."», p. TJ3 I , $ 
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APPENDIX "D" 
§ 1 1 3 5 5 UNIFORM CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES Div. 10 
§ 11355. Sale or furnishing substance falsely represented to be 
a controlled substance; punishment 
Every person who agrees, consents, or in any manner offers to 
unlawfully sell, furnish, transport, administer, or give (1) any con-
trolled substance specified in subdivision (b) or (c) of Section 11054, 
specified in paragraph (10), (11), (12), or (17) of subdivision (d) of 
Section 11054, or specified in subdivision (b) or (c) of Section 11055 
or, (2) any controlled substance classified in Schedule III, IV, or V 
which is a narcotic drug to any person, or off el's, arranges, or negoti-
ates to have any such controlled substance unlawfully sold, delivered, 
transported, furnished, administered, or given to any person and then 
sells, delivers, furnishes, transports, administers, or gives, or offers, 
arranges, or negotiates to have sold, delivered, transported, fur-
nished, administered, or given to any person any other liquid, sub-
stance, or material in lieu of any such controlled substance shall be 
punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one 
year, or in the state prison for not more than 10 years. 
(Added by Stats.1972, c. 1407, p. 3014, § 3. Amended by Stats.1973, c. 1078, 
p. 2176, § 7, eff. Oct. 1. 1973). 
Historical Note 
or 11 to any person, or offers, nminxes. 
or negotiates to have any controlled sub-
stance classified in Schedule I or 11" at 
tin* beginning of condition (12) ; and. sub-
stituted the words "such controlled sub 
stance" for the words "any controlled 
substance classified in Schedule I or II" 
near the end of the second condition. 
Resentencing for violations between 
March 7. H)73. and October 1. 1!>73. sec 
1 listorieal Note under section 113."0. 
Derivation: Former section IITrfh't, add-
ed by Stats.liKW. c 111L\ p. 3W4. $ t». 
Cross References 
Arrest of alien for violation of this section, notice to federal agency, see $ 113<>it. 
Conviction of aliens, notice to federal agency, sec § 11W>0. 
Denial of probation or suspension of sentence after conviction of violation of this sec-
tion, prior conviction of certain offenses, see $ 11370. 
Kxpcnditurcs to secure evidence, see $ 11-br>4. 
Fine in addition to imprisonment for conviction of violation «»f this section, sec tj 1137'2. 
Xarcotics offense defined as violation of this section for purposes of Kducatiou Code, 
see Kducatiou Code $ 1*21)1 !!.!">. 
Probation or suspension of sentence, previous convictions, see $ 11370. 
Recovery of funds expended in investigations, see $ 11 Td»1. 
Kepis? ration a< controlled substance offender, conviction of offense defined in this sec-
tion, see $ 1 l."i!MI et se<j. 
School employees, notice to sehool authorities upon arrest for violation of this section. 
see § nr»oi. 
Library References 
1 Tups IIIKI Narcotics C=H»K, 133. C I S . 1 >rugs and Narcotics $$ 1<*.J, )i\7), 
]<;7. KIN. 173. 22o to 2 3 . 
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The 1073 amendment designated condi-
tions (1) and (2): inserted in the first 
condition the words "specified in sul>divi-
sion (|i) or (e) of section 110.r»| or speci-
fied in subdivision in paragraph (10), 
(11), (12) or (17) of subdivision (d) of 
section 11054. or specified in subdivision 
(b) or (c) of section 110.V> or/*; substi-
tuted the words "any controlled substance 
classified in Schedule 111, IV, or V which 
is a nareotie drug to any person, or of-
fers, arranges, or negotiates to have any 
such controlled substance" for "any con-
trolled substance classified in Schedule 1 
APPENDIX "E" 
453.323 CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 
(c) For a third or subsequent offense, or if the offender has previously 
been convicted two or more times of violating this section or of any 
offense under the laws of the United States or any state, territory or dis-
trict which, if committed in this state, would amount to a violation of 
this section, by imprisonment in the state prison for life or for a definite 
period of not less than 5 years nor more than 20 years and may be fur-
ther punished by a fine of not more than $ 10,000 for each offense. 
5. The court shall not grant probation to or suspend the sentence of 
any person convicted under subsection 4 and punishable pursuant to 
paragraph (b) or (c) of subsection 4. 
(Added to NRS by 1971, 2018; A 1973, 1213, 1372; 1977, 1411) 
453.323 Offenses and penalties: Prohibited acts "C"; penalties. 
1. Any person who offers, agrees or arranges unlawfully to sell, sup-
ply, transport, deliver, give or administer any controlled substance classi-
fied in NRS 453.161 or 453.171 and then sells, supplies, transports, 
delivers, gives or administers any other substance in place of such con-
trolled substance shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail 
for not more than 1 year or in the state prison for not less than 1 year nor 
more than 10 years and may be further punished by a fine of not more 
than $10,000 for each offense. 
2. The court shall not grant probation to or suspend the sentence of 
any person convicted of violating subsection 1 if he has previously been 
convicted of any felony offense under the Uniform Controlled Substances 
Act or of any offense under the laws of the United States or any state, ter-
ritory or district which, if committed in this state, would amount to a fel-
ony under the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. 
3. Any person who offers, agrees or arranges unlawfully to sell, sup-
ply, transport, deliver, cive or administer any controlled substance clas-
sified in NRS 453.181^ 453.191 or 453.201 and then sells, supplies, 
transports, delivers, gives or administers any other substance in place of 
such controlled substance shall be punished by imprisonment in the 
county jail for not more than 1 year or in the state prison for not less 
than 1 year nor more than 6 years and may be further punished by a 
fine of not more than $5,000 for each offense. 
(Added to NRS by 1977, 1408) 
453.326 Offenses and penalties: Prohibited acts "D"; penalties. 
1. It is unlawful for any person: 
(a) To refuse or fail to make, keep or furnish any record, notification, 
order form, statement, invoice or information required under the provi-
sions of NRS 453.01J to 453.551, inclusive; or 
(b) To refuse an entry into any premises for any inspection authorized 
by the provisions of NRS 453.011 to 453.551, inclusive; or 
(c) Knowingly to keep or maintain any store, shop, warehouse, dwell-
ing, building, vehicle, boat, aircraft or other structure or place which is 
resorted to by persons using controlled substances in violation of the pro-
visions of NRS 453.01 1 to 453.551, inclusive, for the purpose of using 
these substances, or which is used for keeping or selling them in violation 
of such sections. 
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APPENDIX "F" 
In the Fourth Judicial District Court 
of the State of Utah 
In and For Utah County 
ME STATE OF UTAH, ^ ^ " MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 7062 
DATED August 25 , 1978 
3ARY DALE JACOBSEN, Defendant \ J - Robert Bul lock, JUDGE 
R U L I N G 
Having heard the arguments of counsel and having read and considered the 
aemoranda filed herein, the Court now orders that the Information be quashed upon 
±e ground and for the reason that it does not allege an offense. 
The Court is of the opinion that an offense occurs under Section 58-37-8 
'1) (a) (iv) U.C.A., 1953 as amended, if and only if a particular controlled 
substance is arranged to be sold, and that some other substance is substituted 
JI lieu thereof. 
:c: Noall T. Wootton 
Gregory M. Warner 
